CISPA
Browse
cispa_all_2747.pdf (2.18 MB)

Fidelius: Protecting User Secrets from Compromised Browsers

Download (2.18 MB)
conference contribution
posted on 2023-11-29, 18:09 authored by Saba Eskandarian, Jonathan Cogan, Sawyer Birnbaum, Peh Chang Wei Brandon, Dillon Franke, Forest Fraser, Gaspar Garcia, Eric Gong, Hung T. Nguyen, Taresh K. Sethi, Vishal Subbiah, Michael BackesMichael Backes, Giancarlo PellegrinoGiancarlo Pellegrino, Dan Boneh
Users regularly enter sensitive data, such as passwords, credit card numbers, or tax information, into the browser window. While modern browsers provide powerful client-side privacy measures to protect this data, none of these defenses prevent a browser compromised by malware from stealing it. In this work, we present Fidelius, a new architecture that uses trusted hardware enclaves integrated into the browser to enable protection of user secrets during web browsing sessions, even if the entire underlying browser and OS are fully controlled by a malicious attacker. Fidelius solves many challenges involved in providing protection for browsers in a fully malicious environment, offering support for integrity and privacy for form data, JavaScript execution, XMLHttpRequests, and protected web storage, while minimizing the TCB. Moreover, interactions between the enclave and the browser, the keyboard, and the display all require new protocols, each with their own security considerations. Finally, Fidelius takes into account UI considerations to ensure a consistent and simple interface for both developers and users. As part of this project, we develop the first open source system that provides a trusted path from input and output peripherals to a hardware enclave with no reliance on additional hypervisor security assumptions. These components may be of independent interest and useful to future projects. We implement and evaluate Fidelius to measure its performance overhead, finding that Fidelius imposes acceptable overhead on page load and user interaction for secured pages and has no impact on pages and page components that do not use its enhanced security features.

History

Preferred Citation

Saba Eskandarian, Jonathan Cogan, Sawyer Birnbaum, Peh Brandon, Dillon Franke, Forest Fraser, Gaspar Garcia, Eric Gong, Hung Nguyen, Taresh Sethi, Vishal Subbiah, Michael Backes, Giancarlo Pellegrino and Dan Boneh. Fidelius: Protecting User Secrets from Compromised Browsers. In: IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (S&P). 2019.

Primary Research Area

  • Threat Detection and Defenses

Secondary Research Area

  • Empirical and Behavioral Security

Name of Conference

IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (S&P)

Legacy Posted Date

2018-11-26

Open Access Type

  • Unknown

BibTeX

@inproceedings{cispa_all_2747, title = "Fidelius: Protecting User Secrets from Compromised Browsers", author = "Eskandarian, Saba and Cogan, Jonathan and Birnbaum, Sawyer and Brandon, Peh Chang Wei and Franke, Dillon and Fraser, Forest and Garcia, Gaspar and Gong, Eric and Nguyen, Hung T. and Sethi, Taresh K. and Subbiah, Vishal and Backes, Michael and Pellegrino, Giancarlo and Boneh, Dan", booktitle="{IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (S&P)}", year="2019", }

Usage metrics

    Categories

    No categories selected

    Exports

    RefWorks
    BibTeX
    Ref. manager
    Endnote
    DataCite
    NLM
    DC