Third-party libraries ease the development of large-scale software systems. However, libraries often execute with significantly more privilege than needed to complete their task. Such additional privilege is sometimes exploited at runtime via inputs passed to a library, even when the library itself is not actively malicious. We present Mir, a system addressing dynamic compromise by introducing a fine-grained read-write-execute (RWX) permission model at the boundaries of libraries: every field of every free variable name in the context of an imported library is governed by a permission set. To help specify the permissions given to existing code, Mir’s automated inference generates default permissions by analyzing how libraries are used by their clients. Applied to over 1,000 JavaScript libraries for Node.js, Mir shows practical security (61/63 attacks mitigated), performance (2.1s for static analysis and +1.93% for dynamic enforcement), and compatibility (99.09%) characteristics and enables a novel quantification of privilege reduction.
History
Preferred Citation
Nikos Vasilakis, Cristian-Alexandru Staicu, Grigoris Ntousakis, Konstantinos Kallas, Ben Karel, André DeHon and Michael Pradel. Preventing Dynamic Library Compromise on Node.js via RWX-Based Privilege Reduction. In: ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS). 2021.
Primary Research Area
Empirical and Behavioral Security
Secondary Research Area
Threat Detection and Defenses
Name of Conference
ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS)
Legacy Posted Date
2021-09-17
Open Access Type
Unknown
BibTeX
@inproceedings{cispa_all_3478,
title = "Preventing Dynamic Library Compromise on Node.js via RWX-Based Privilege Reduction",
author = "Vasilakis, Nikos and Staicu, Cristian-Alexandru and Ntousakis, Grigoris and Kallas, Konstantinos and Karel, Ben and DeHon, André and Pradel, Michael",
booktitle="{ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS)}",
year="2021",
}