Speculative execution allows CPUs to improve performance
by using prediction mechanisms that predict the outcome
of branching and other instructions without waiting for the
correct result. When the prediction is wrong, the CPU rolls
back the effects of the speculatively-executed instructions on
the architectural state (i.e., memory, registers). However, the
side effects on the microarchitectural state, which includes
the cache and buffers, are not rolled back and thus can
leak possible confidential data that was speculatively accessed
(Listing 1). Spectre attacks [1–4] demonstrate that most modern CPUs are affected by this speculation-based vulnerability.
History
Preferred Citation
Xaver Fabian, Koby Chan and Marco Patrignani. Formal Verification of Spectres Combination. In: Workshop on Programming Languages and Analysis for Security (PLAS). 2021.
Primary Research Area
Reliable Security Guarantees
Name of Conference
Workshop on Programming Languages and Analysis for Security (PLAS)
Legacy Posted Date
2022-10-13
Open Access Type
Green
BibTeX
@inproceedings{cispa_all_3820,
title = "Formal Verification of Spectres Combination",
author = "Fabian, Xaver and Chan, Koby and Patrignani, Marco",
booktitle="{Workshop on Programming Languages and Analysis for Security (PLAS)}",
year="2021",
}